‘Noble’ Ascesis Between Nietzsche and Foucault by Urpeth, James
[Published in New Nietzsche Studies, Vol 2: 3/4, Summer 1998, pp. 65 - 91] 







      I...want to make asceticism natural again: in place of the aim of
                                    denial, the aim of strengthening; a gymnastics of the will... 
                                    (WP no. 915, p.483/KSA 12, p.387)

 Undoubtedly Foucault’s thought was profoundly ‘Nietzschean’.1 But that his texts also contain an albeit largely implicit interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought of the same order of significance as those offered explicitly by, for instance, Heidegger and Deleuze is less widely recognised.2 The Nietzsche/Foucault relation cannot be characterised merely in terms of the former’s ‘influence’ on the latter. I shall argue, through the examination of how Foucault develops a specific aspect of Nietzsche’s thought, that their relationship can be conceived in terms of mutual radicalisation.3 
 The area of shared concern in question is that between Foucault’s notion of the ‘technique of existence’ and his conception of the relationship between ‘power’ and ‘pleasure’ and Nietzsche’s analysis of the ‘meaning of the ascetic ideal’ and related issues. In HS I-III Foucault tacitly reveals the highly nuanced character of Nietzsche’s evaluation in GM of the ‘ascetic ideal’ and thereby offers resources for the interpretation of the theme of the ‘transvaluation’ (Umwertung) of the ‘Platonic-Christian’ tradition. The central aspect of HS I-III for this paper is Foucault’s reconstruction of Greco-Roman ascesis. I claim that Foucault’s explication of this theme implicitly executes a non-reductive overcoming of seemingly conflictual aspects of Nietzsche’s thought that has produced a basic contrast in its interpretation.   
 In the first section I offer a sketch of the themes in Nietzsche’s thought of relevance to my discuscussion as a whole. In the second section I outline two contrasting interpretations of these themes. In the third section I discuss aspects of Foucault’s thought of importance to my argument. In the fourth section I focus on Foucault’s account of Greco-Roman ascesis. Finally, in the fifth section, I propose and briefly address some questions that seem to challenge the perspective I have outlined and show how the generation of such problems only reinforces the fecundity of the Nietzsche/Foucault relation.
                                                             I
 In an early text Nietzsche describes himself as a ‘cultural physician’ and his fascination with the project of ‘cultural pathology’ never ceased. 4 In PTAG and BT Nietzsche assesses the course of Greek cultural history in terms of the ebb and flow of ‘health’ and ‘sickness’ within it as manifest in the degree to which the Greeks sustained an overcoming of pessimism through an affirmation of the ‘tragic’. Nietzsche’s most extended later exhibition of his skills as a ‘cultural physician’ is GM, a text that is fundamentally ‘diagnostic’ in orientation. Genealogy is perhaps best conceived as the interpretative dissection of the self-legitimising rhetoric of an evaluative regime in order to trace those strands of the ‘emergence’ (Entstehung) and ‘descent’ (Herkunft) of its constitutive values that are indicative of a residual ‘strength’ rather than ‘weakness’.5 Nietzsche explicitly describes the ‘man of the future’, the ‘redeeming man’, as a type in possession of a ‘great health’, a product of a ‘stronger age’ (GM II, sec.24, pp.70-71/KSA 5, pp.335-336).
 This persistent reflection on the nature of ‘health’ and ‘sickness’ lies at the basis of Nietzsche’s provocative challenge to modernity. He uncovers the complex mechanisms through which, uniquely it seems in the case of human beings, the ‘weak’ defeat the ‘strong’ and do so, crucially, without themselves acquiring strength.6 This process culminates, for Nietzsche, in the predominant ‘slavery’ and instinctual enfeeblement of the contemporary age. Nietzsche insists that the most important cultural-political task confronting his age consists of the defence of the ‘strong’ against the ‘weak’ and not vice versa - “that the sick should not make the healthy sick...ought to be the chief concern on earth (GM III, sec.14, p.97/KSA 5, p.371). If this central aspect of Nietzsche’s thought is to be considered seriously and the history of reductive appropriations of it countered then a clarification of the ‘meaning’ of the terms ‘health’ and ‘sickness’ in his texts is a crucial interpretative task.    
 It is clear that Nietzsche conceives the notions of ‘health’ and ‘sickness’, whether on the individual or cultural level, in ‘physiological’ terms.7 His texts tend to identify ‘health’ with the ‘excess’ that characterises ‘superabundant’ and ‘overflowing’ forms of life in which the primacy Nietzsche accords to the ‘venting’ of the ‘will to power’ beyond all mechanistic and teleological principles is evident.8 In contrast, Nietzsche aligns ‘sickness’ with an emphasis on utility characteristic of energetic economies focused on ‘lack’ rather than ‘excess’, determined by self-preservation rather than ‘self-overcoming’. 
 In short, Nietzsche associates ‘health’ with ‘life-ascending’ and ‘sickness’ with ‘life-descending’ phenomena. The ‘healthy’ are inherently powerful whilst the ‘sick’, unable to exercise a power they don’t intrinsically possess, seek to obtain a semblance of it through the acquisition of a derivative and merely relative form of it, namely, the domination of others. Underpinning this configuration of terms in Nietzsche’s thought is a conception of human culture as inextricably embedded within, and determined without remainder by, the profligate primary processes of material nature. Nietzsche insists upon the derivative role of the instinct of self-preservation and the primacy of self-expenditure. He conceives the most fundamental trajectory of material nature in non-teleological terms without reference to gain and loss, origin or end and indifferent to the fate of the ‘individual’.9  
 There is, in a sense, nothing ‘metaphorical’ about Nietzsche’s description of ‘cultural’ phenomena in terms of ‘health’ and ‘sickness’. Nietzsche’s thought surpasses the presuppositions of the ‘fact/value’ and ‘nature/culture’ oppositions in so far as he develops a non-reductive ‘monist’ and non-anthropomorphic ‘materialist’ perspective. Nietzsche jettisons idealist categories (and ‘metaphysical’ materialisms) in his analyses of human cultural history which he interprets in de-anthropologised terms as the interaction of impersonal ‘forces’. The perspectives and evaluations that constitute phenomena are, for Nietzsche, generated by the anonymous procesess of an intrinsically multiple ‘will to power’. Hence it is not, Nietzsche argues, the ‘subject’ that is the source of intelligibility and meaning, rather “the will to power interprets...” (WP no.643, p.342/KSA 12, p.139).10
                                                         II   
 Such an overview of the basic features of Nietzsche’s conception of ‘health’ and ‘sickness’ conceals a fundamental ‘tension’ within his texts which has generated two contrasting accounts of this aspect of his thought. A first interpretation, which I shall term ‘oppositional’, legitimately draws upon some of the most fundamental themes of Nietzsche’s texts.11 These include the ‘affirmation of the Dionysian’, the valorisation of the instinctual and unconscious over the rational and conscious, the critique of morality, the attack on the Platonic-Christian tradition’s hostility to the ‘body’, the sensuous, etc. On the basis of these themes an interpretation is given of Nietzsche which views his conception of the relation between, on the one hand, reason and morality and, on the other hand, ‘nature’ in terms of mutual exclusivity. From this perspective Nietzsche’s early description of his thought as ‘inverted Platonism’ is interpreted in terms of the valorisation of those aspects of existence denigrated within the metaphysical tradition.12  
 On the basis of this reading Nietzsche is taken to anticipate the ‘Freudian’ conception of the relation between ‘civilisation’ and ‘nature’ as a negation involving the ‘renunciation of instinct’ through prohibition and censorship. Nietzsche’s challenge to the value of civilisation, his seemingly unequivocal condemnation of the ‘taming’ of the ‘animal’ in man, is read as an indication of a contrast to Freud but only one that underwrites the, apparently shared, oppositional structure of their thought. Hence, unlike Freud’s compromise with bourgeois values and reinforcement of the ‘normalized’ ego, Nietzsche is taken to recommend an indiscriminate unleashing of the ‘libido’ and the condemnation of any problematization of life as an ‘inhibition’, a symptom of ‘weakness’ indicative of a degeneration of the instincts.13   
 From this ‘oppostional’ perspective Nietzsche is conceived as a philosopher of transgression who extols, albeit in a non-Rousseauian sense, a ‘return to nature’. He is read as a thinker who, hostile to all ‘improvers of mankind’, promotes total license and, from the perspective of ‘morality as anti-nature’, pursues the affirmation of nature against any ethical interrogation.14 Whilst undoubtedly a clichéd reading, this libertarian interpretation of Nietzsche has had a considerable historical currency and is undeniably frequently manifest in his texts. Within this interpretative stance Nietzsche’s conception of ‘health’, and the ‘affirmation’ it is aligned with, is contrasted in negative terms with all forms of self-restraint and ethical self-reflection. A further important presupposition of this approach to Nietzsche’s thought that can also appeal to considerable textual support is its conception of his account of the nature of power and resistance to it according to what can be termed the ‘repression/transgression’ model.
 The second interpretation of Nietzsche’s texts, which I shall term the ‘non-oppositional’ or ‘economic’, rejects the ‘oppositional’ reading on the grounds that it reduces Nietzsche’s thought to ‘metaphysical’ structures which he persistently attacked.15 According to this second interpretation Nietzsche undertakes a critque of regimes of value in terms of a notion of power conceived in terms of the differential ‘relations of forces’. Nietzsche, it is argued, denies that reason and morality have a ‘pure’ origin as, no less than the instincts and desires they monitor, they are part of the ‘whole’, or the ‘economy of life’.16 Idealist interpretations of the origins of reason and morality, whether theological or secular, are rejected by Nietzsche in favour of a ‘naturalised’ conception of them as an immanent process of auto-subjugation in which life, through human beings, turns against and complicates itself. This overcoming of oppositional schemas is clearly stated in the following passage, 
          The misunderstanding of passsion and reason, as if the latter were an independent 
            entity and not a system of various passions and desires; as if every passsion did not
            possess its own quantum of reason (WP no. 387, p.208/KSA 13, p.131).17 
 This reading of Nietzsche conceives his critical task as the ‘renaturalisation’ of reason and morality that interprets the ‘human’ in toto in terms of conflicting impersonal processes and drives. It is argued that Nietzsche does not recommend a ‘return to nature’ as he contests the view that any dimension of the human animal ever has, or could, transcend nature. Rather than a ‘return’ Nietzsche seeks to “translate man back into nature” (BGE sec.230, p.143/KSA 5, p.169), a project which, in both its critical and affirmative aspects, he terms ‘moralistic naturalism’ (WP no.299, p.168/KSA 12, p.380). This does not entail a ‘primitivist’ agenda, a misreading which can only be sustained if a process of ‘translation’ is mistakenly identified with a project of ‘return’.18 As Nietzsche states, 
         ...this is my proposition; the ‘wild beast’ has not been laid to rest at all, it lives,
            it flourishes, it has merely become - deified...the terrible basic text homo natura
            must again be discerned...that eternal basic text homo natura (BGE secs. 229-230, 
            pp.140, 142/KSA 5, pp.166, 169).
  The second, ‘economic’, reading of Nietzsche emphasises the extent to which, in his most radical vein, he overcomes the man/nature opposition and develops a generalised ‘libidinal’ account of human culture which conceives interpretation and evaluation as material processes. This ‘semiotic’ potential of nature itself, denied by idealist ontologies (both theological and humanist), is implicit in the passage cited above. From this perspective, even the most extreme of ‘moral’ phenomena, the ‘ascetic priest’, remains a manifestation of an immanently conceived ‘will’, albeit as a ‘will to nothingness’ (GM III sec.28, p.128/KSA 5, p.412).19 As Nietzsche insists, “man still prefers to will nothingness than not will” (ibid).
 The ‘non-oppositional’ interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought argues that the most radical aspects of his critique of reason and morality are not aimed at them per se but at idealist (and anthropomorphic materialist) interpretations of them and the claims to ontological primordiality made for them. Nietzsche’s critique of reason and morality is a process of renaturalisation and displacement which views them as highly derivative ‘effects’ of an impersonal play of forces. 
 A key indication of this approach is Nietzsche’s constant insistence on the libidinal undercurrents of morality, the pleasures of self-mortification that characterise the erotic genius of the West. For Nietzsche the specific instinctual source of Platonic-Christian morality is ‘cruelty’ (Grausamkeit) as inflicted both on oneself and others. Nietzsche identifies the pleasure taken in inflicting this cruelty as the ‘origin’ of the ‘moral conceptual world’ of ‘guilt’, ‘bad conscience’ etc., which he describes as the “most primitive and basic festive joys of man” (GM II sec.6, p.46/KSA 5, p.301). It is the libidinal investment of morality, the source of its otherwise inexplicable appeal and success, that is the affective paradox Nietzsche uncovers at the heart of asceticism which tends to conceal the pleasure it takes in ‘self-denial’. 
 For Nietzsche the ‘higher culture’ of modern man (ie. ‘humanism’) is not an indication of an increasingly successful departure from, and transcendence of, nature but rather an “ever-increasing spiritualisation and ‘deification’ of cruelty” (ibid). This libidinal source of asceticism in the pleasures of cruelty is described thus, 
        ...there is an...abundant, over-abundant enjoyment of one’s suffering, of one’s
           own suffering, of making oneself suffer - and wherever man allows himself to be
           persuaded to self-denial in the religious sense, or to self-mutilation...or in general
           to desensualisation, decarnalisation...he is secretly lured and urged onward by his 
           cruelty, by the dangerous thrills of cruelty directed against himself  (BGE, sec. 229,
           pp.140-141/KSA 5, p. 166).
 A further forceful statement of Nietzsche’s fascination with asceticism’s passionate denunciation of the instincts, the yield of pleasure inherent in its combatting of certain sources of pleasures, is the claim that, 
         ...man is the cruellest animal towards himself; and with all who call themselves 
           “sinners” and “bearers of the cross” and “penitents” do not overlook the sensual
           pleasure that is in this complaint and accusation.20
 The second interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought argues that it is at its most radical not when it merely affirms the ‘body’ as a ‘transgression’ of the allegedly ‘repressive’ forces of reason and morality but in its development of a non-oppositional critique of them which exposes their libidinal essence. From this perspective Nietzsche excavates the specific erotic economy of Platonic-Christian metaphysics and conceives the ‘ascetic ideal’ as its principal technique for accessing the heightened pleasures of ‘self-denial’ which its practitioners, given their libidinal disposition, prefer to the more immediate satisfaction of other desires. 
 More tortuously it could be said that the Platonic-Christian erotic type is incapable of restraining its desire for the (sensual) pleasures of self-restraint; it is unable to restrain its lust for ‘deferred gratification’. Even the extremest form of asceticism consists of an indulgence of some libidinal pleasures at the expense of others and never of the expurgation of pleasure per se. This perspective, which rejects any ‘dualism’ in the relation between reason, morality and ‘desire’ is evident in the claim that, 
        ...fundamentally...everything sublime up to the highest and most refined thrills 
           of metaphysics, derives its sweetness solely from the ingredient of cruelty mixed
           in with it (BGE sec. 229, p.140/KSA 5, p.166).
 For the second interpretation the radicality of Nietzsche’s stance in such a passage lies in its contestation of the moralist’s non-libidinal self-image, the self-deluding rhetoric of ‘purity’ which the practice of ‘genealogy’ endeavours to ‘unmask’. Asceticism is thus interpreted as a highly-charged, entirely eroticised phenomenon, a relentlessly pursued ars erotica practiced by voluptuaries of ‘denial’. This reading of Nietzsche can draw support from both his ‘early’ and ‘late’ texts as the following examples demonstrate. 
 In BT Nietzsche surpasses his initially oppositional presentation of the relation between Socratism and the Dionysian and offers an account of the ‘Socratic tendency’ which  emphasises its impersonal instinctual source. As he states, 
         ...this logical urge became manifest in Socrates...its unbridled flood...displays
            a natural power such as we encounter to our awed amazement only in the very
            greatest instinctive forces...the enormous driving-wheel of logical Socratism is in 
            motion, as it were, behind Socrates...it must be viewed through Socrates as through
            a shadow (BT sec.13, pp.88-89/KSA 1, pp.90-91).
 The complex nature of Nietzsche’s evaluation in GM of the multiple meanings of the ‘ascetic ideal’ is particularly apparent in his discussion of its role in the life of the artist.21 Nietzsche contends that Wagner declines from the ‘health’ manifest in his early work to the ‘sickness’ of Parsifal which extols the Christian themes of ‘salvation’ and ‘redemption’. Nietzsche contrasts what I have termed the ‘economic’ conception of the chastity/sensuality relation found in the early Wagner with the oppositional or ‘moral’ view of it that characterises his later work.22 Thus Nietzsche explicitly distinguishes chastity from asceticism, sugesting that in ‘healthy’ types it has a non-ascetic meaning. As he states, “...there is not, necessarily, an antithesis between chastity and sensuality” (GM III sec.2, p.73/KSA 5, p.340). From a similarly non-oppositional perspective the affirmative art of the early Wagner is described as involving the “highest intellectualisation and sensualisation” (GM III sec.3, p.74/KSA 5, p.342). Hence, Nietzsche neither condemns chastity (as ‘repressive’) nor praises sensuality (as ‘transgressive’) per se, as the first intepretation outlined above would tend to suggest. Instead he criticises those in whom they are ‘morally’ related in terms of negation and celebrates those who sustain an ‘extra-moral’ conception of the differential interplay of such forces within themselves. This ‘balance’ is conceived in a pre-oppositional way and in ‘healthy’ types the ‘economic’ nature of the relation between chastity and sensuality is sustained without recourse to dialectical resolution. As Nietzsche states, 
         ...all healthy, cheerful mortals...are far from seeing their precarious balancing act 
            between ‘animal and angel’ as necessarily one of the arguments against life, - the  
            best and the brightest amongst them...actually found in it one more of life’s charms. 
            Such ‘contradictions’ are what makes life so enticing... (GM III sec.2, p.73/KSA 5, p.341).23
 From this perspective, just as the ‘healthy’ types’ conception of chastity and employment of the ‘ascetic ideal’ in general has to be distinguished from that of the ‘ascetic priest’, so its affirmation of sensuality, a renewed ‘innocence of the senses’, cannot be aligned with the licentiousness of the sensualist. Nietzsche hints, in his description of those who indulge in permissive forms of sensualism as ‘pigs’ (ibid), at a non-moral critique of the sexually incontinent who remain intrinsically ‘moral’ types in whom chastity and sensuality are oppositionally related.24 
 Hence, Nietzsche clearly does not align the unrestrained affirmation of sensualism with ‘health’ and chastity with ‘sickness’ as an ‘oppositional’ reading of his texts would suggest. Rather, he conceives the ‘noble’ as a ‘whole’ human being in whom chastity is not employed as an instrument of ‘self-denial’ but as a technique of intensification, another stimulant and seduction to the ‘enhancement of life’.25 The ‘healthy’ type, having no ‘fear’ of the self-expenditure that an affirmation of the disseminative forces of the ‘body’ entails, does not, unlike the anxious ‘slave’, employ the ‘ascetic ideal’ merely as a means of self-preservation. 
 Nietzsche reinforces this point in his assessment of the ‘chastity of philosophers’ which, in the ‘healthy’ cases, is an employment of the ‘ascetic ideal’ that is not merely “chastity from ascetic scruple or hatred of the senses” (GM III sec.8, p.85/KSA 5, p.355). As in the case of the artist, Nietzsche’s evaluation of the philosopher’s appropriation of the ‘ascetic ideal’ is far from unequivocally critical. As he states, 
         ...on seeing an ascetic ideal, the philosopher smiles because he sees an optimum
            condition of the highest and boldest intellectuality, - he does not deny ‘existence’
            by doing so, but affirms his existence and only his existence...” (GM III sec.7, p.82/KSA 5,
            p.351).
 The fusion, in this passage, of the ‘ascetic ideal’ with the affirmation of existence demonstrates that Nietzsche did not dismiss the ‘ascetic ideal’ in principle as the first, ‘oppositional’, interpretation of his conception of the morality/desire relation proposes. Instead, Nietzsche assesses the ‘health’ of any instantiation of the ‘ascetic ideal’ by conducting an analysis of the ‘type of will’ that inhabits it, thereby reminding his readers that interpretation constitutes essence.26 Clearly, for Nietzsche, the rejection of asceticism is not necessarily a symptom of ‘nobility’ and ‘health’ nor its employment inherently an indication of ‘slavery’ and ‘sickness’. Hence, there can be ‘noble’ ascetics and ‘slavish’ sensualists and vice versa. 
 I have argued that, although it can appeal to substantial texual support, a reading of Nietzsche’s texts in ‘oppositional’ terms can only provide a highly reductive interpretation of the subtlety of his most radical account of ‘health’ and critique of  Platonic-Christian values. Nietzsche’s nuanced assessment of the ‘ascetic ideal’ requires an ‘economic’ interpretation. Crucially the second, ‘non-oppostional’, reading implicitly claims that Nietzsche overcame the ‘repression/transgression’ model of the nature of power and its contestation.
                                                              III
 A central aspect of Foucault’s thought is his challenge to the traditional conception of the nature of power and the rethinking of the nature of resistance to it. For Foucault the traditional view conceives power in ‘negative’ terms. Foucault rejects this in favour of a notion of ‘positive’ power which (understood in historical and ‘immanent’ terms as a ‘relation of forces’) accords it a ‘primordial’ ontologico-transcendental status. This conception of the ‘productivity’ of power as continuous with ‘being’ and therefore constitutive of both the objects of experience and ‘knowledge’ of them contrasts with the ‘negative’ view for which power has an ontologically derivative status.27 
 Foucault’s texts demonstrate the inadequacy of the ‘Leviathan’ or ‘juridical’ model of power that assumes the priority of law, sovereignty and prohibition. Power, conceived in this ‘negative’ way, is taken to operate predominantly through the containment and censorship of a pre-given domain of objects, subjects, and relationships. The ontological extension of power is, on this view, strictly limited so far as entities are posited as intrinsically ‘outside’ power-relations. They merely await ‘liberation’ from the external restraints of a negatively operative power in order to recover their essential freedom conceived as the absence of power per se. In contrast, Foucault’s ‘positive’ conception of power accords it a primary synthetic function that constitutes objects and the historical relations (discursive and non-discursive) in which they find themselves always already projected ‘as such’ (eg. the ‘mad’, the ‘pervert’, the ‘delinquent’ etc). 
 In short, power positively produces objects and relations of experience and is thus the ‘condition of possiblity’ of any negative imposition of constraint. Entities (both ‘objects’ and ‘subjects’) and the ‘knowledge’ of them do not precede the power relations which constitute their, historically conceived, ‘essence’. 
 The theme of ‘positive’ power is central to Foucault’s notion of the ‘power/knowledge’ axis. This is clear from the following passage in which the displacement of ‘negative’ by ‘positive’ power is clearly stated, 
         We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms:
            it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In 
            fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals
            of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this
            production.28
 Foucault’s prioritising of a ‘positive’ over a ‘negative’ conception of power is arguably nowhere more radically illustrated than in his critique of the ‘repressive hypothesis’, the received understanding of the nature of the relation between power and bodily pleasure in the modern period.29 These themes in Foucault’s thought clearly have a ‘Nietzschean’ source. His development and deployment of them tacitly undermine the first, and reinforce the second, of the two interpretations of Nietzsche outlined above.
 For Foucault ‘repression’, a notion wholly premised upon the model of ‘negative’ power, is an insufficiently supple concept for an adequate description of the multifarious relations of reciprocity, constitution and mutual incitement that define the relation between power and bodily pleasures in the modern period. In contrast, Foucault argues that ‘positive’ power constructs a field of ‘sexuality’ characterised by a ‘hermeneutics of desire’, the guise adopted by ‘pastoral power’ in a post-ecclesiastic context.30 This is a key example of the processes through which, “a human being turns him - or herself into a subject”, the third of the ‘modes of objectification’ that, Foucault argues, “transform human beings into subjects”.31     
 The crucial significance of this process is that it concerns an activity of self-constitution beyond the constraints imposed by ‘external’ authorities and institutions. This process of self-objectification plays a key role in the process through which, “men have learned to recognise themselves as subjects of sexuality”.32 The focus of Foucault’s analysis of this phenomenon of auto-subjectification is ascesis, the techniques of self-disciplining and self-examination in relation to sexual pleasure that play a central role in the ‘cultivation of the self’.33
  In HS I-III Foucault undertakes a development of his account of the ‘knowledge/power’ axis that is of great significance to a consideration of the relationship between his and Nietzsche’s thought. The key theme here is Foucault’s libidinisation of his conception of the nature of power, a perspective outlined in the following passage, 
         The object, in short, is to define the regime of power-knowledge-pleasure that
            sustains the discourse on human sexuality...entailing effects that may be those
            of refusal, blockage, and invalidation, but also incitement and intensification: in 
            short, the “polymorphous techniques of power” (HS I, p.11). 
 Hence, for Foucault power and pleasure mutually reinforce rather than merely negate each other. The ‘power-knowledge-pleasure’ relation, as a form of ‘positive’ power, cannot be characterised in terms of ‘repression’. As Foucault states, 
         ...a sensualisation of power and a gain of pleasure...Power operated as a mechanism
           of attraction; it drew out those peculiarities over which it kept watch. Pleasure spread
           to the power that harried it; power anchored the pleasure it uncovered...mechanisms 
           with a double impetus: power and pleasure...The power that lets itself be invaded by
           the pleasure it is pursuing...power asserting itself in the pleasure of...scandalising or 
           resisting. Capture and seduction, confrontation and mutual reinforcement...These 
           attractions, these evasions, these circular incitements have traced around bodies and
           sexes, not boundaries to be crossed, but perpetual spirals of power and pleasure (HS I, 
           pp.44-45). 
 On the basis of this libidinised conception of ‘positive’ power the traditional ‘oppositional’ understanding of the relation, in terms of ‘repression’ and negation, between ‘morality’ and ‘desire’ is surpassed. Foucault, implicitly drawing upon the most radical resources of Nietzsche’s thought, emphasises that the power that allegedly ‘represses’ pleasure is itself libidinally invested. This underwrites the ‘economic’ interpretation of Nietzsche outlined above which stresses the extent to which Nietzsche came to conceive the ‘ascetic ideal’ as a technique of erotic intensification. Foucault reiterates this perspective in the claim that, 
         Pleasure and power do not cancel or turn back against one another; they overlap, and 
            reinforce one another. They are linked together by complex mechanisms and devices
            of excitation and incitement (HS I, pp.48-49).
 It can be plausibly argued, therefore, that both Nietzsche and Foucault undertake a renaturalisation rather than a rejection of the ‘ascetic ideal’ which stresses the primacy of its affective and libidinal essence over its ostensibly ‘moral’ character. Both thinkers challenge the received historical narrative concerning the alleged ‘repression’ of the ‘body’ etc., in Western culture. Instead, they emphasise that, through its asceticism, this tradition has steadfastly refused to deny the pleasures of self-restraint and has pursued, in an unihibited way, the erotics of inhibition or, what Nietzsche terms, a “saintly form of debauchery” (GM III sec.1, p.72/KSA 5, p.339). Hence, only if the nature of power is reductively conceived in ‘negative’ terms and its intrinsically libidinal character overlooked can an oppositional interpretation of Nietzsche’s view of ‘health’ and ‘sickness’ be sustained in which the former is identified with the rejection, the latter with the adoption, of the ‘ascetic ideal’. 
 Foucault’s rethinking of the nature of power and his recovery of the notion of ascesis reveal that, in reading Nietzsche, it is no longer a question of the ‘affirmation’ or ‘denial’ of nature that is the criterion of ‘nobility’ and ‘slavery’ but the contrast between ‘healthy’ and ‘sick’ practices of self-disciplining, ‘extra-moral’ or ‘moral’ inhabitations of the ‘ascetic ideal’. It is, therefore, not the presence or absence of self-regulation that is the hallmark of ‘health’ and ‘nobility’ but its character, the ‘type of will’ manifest in the practice of ascesis. What such a ‘life-affirming’ form of ascesis might consist in is amply illustrated in Foucault’s description of Greco-Roman forms of it. 
                                                             IV
 Foucault’s account of Greco-Roman ascesis provides a compelling illustration of the possibility of what, in Nietzschean terms, can be termed an ‘extra-moral’ ethical practice, a form of self-regulation without an expurgation of bodily pleasures and not, therefore, founded on a ‘will to purity’. Throughout his reconstruction of the ancients’ problematisation of sexual pleasure Foucault implicitly underscores his critique of ‘negative’ conceptions of power in general and the ‘repressive hypothesis’ in particular.
 The relevance of HS II-III for this paper arises from the fundamentally ‘Nietzschean’ character of Foucault’s approach to the Greco-Roman worlds. The significance of this reconstruction of ancient forms of ascesis is the example Foucault provides of a non-Christian ethical self-interrogation in relation to the bodily pleasures. This tacitly challenges the identity of the ‘ascetic ideal’ with the values of the Platonic-Christian tradition and thereby undermines the claim of the first, ‘oppositional’, interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of the relationship between morality and ‘desire’ to represent the most radical stance his thought attained on these issues. 
 If, on the basis of the ‘affirmative’ nature of its relation to the ‘body’, Greco-Roman ascesis can be described as predominantly ‘healthy’ in Nietzsche’s sense, then a reorientation of the standard account of his critique of the Platonic-Christian tradition is required. This is because Foucault’s recovery of historical forms of affirmative ascesis cannot be described in terms of the customary oppositional interpretation, often seemingly endorsed by Nietzsche’s text, between the themes of the ‘affirmation of the Dionysian’ and the ‘ascetic ideal’.
 A re-evaluation of the different ‘voices’ within Nietzsche’s texts is implicit in HS I-III. It becomes possible, on the basis of Foucault’s ‘application’ of Nietzsche’s analysis of the ‘ascetic ideal’ to the ancients, to disentangle what I have termed the ‘oppositional’ and ‘economic’ strands of Nietzsche’s critique of Platonic-Christian values and to appreciate the radicality of the latter over the former. Hence, in the less radical dimensions of his thought, Nietzsche is seen often to have implicitly accepted the insidious exclusive appropriation of the ‘ascetic ideal’ by Chrisitianity and further to have succumbed to an interpretation of it as essentially a ‘moral’ phenomenon. From this perspective Nietzsche frequently seems to align a critique of Platonic-Christian values with a hostility to the self-disciplining of the pleasures per se (rather than just ‘reactive’ forms of such self-problematisation). Nietzsche, in his least radical moments, identifies the ‘affirmation of the Dionysian’ with an unequivocal rejection of ascesis assuming, on the basis of a tacit capitulation to the Christian ‘moral’ appropriation of it, that it is  intrinsically a symptom of ‘sickness’. Alternatively, Nietzsche’s thought attains its most radical stance when, overcoming all ‘oppositional’ perspectives, he identifies the project of ‘affirmation’ with a non-ascetic ascesis,  an ‘extra-moral’ asceticism which reclaims the ‘ascetic ideal’ from the grip of Platonic-Christian values.34        
 Foucault’s account of the Greeks’ ‘use of pleasures’ (chresis aphrodision) is pervaded by a ‘Nietzschean’ sensibility, their forms of ascesis are clearly described, following Nietzsche, as ‘aesthetic’ rather than ‘moral’ phenomena.35 Foucault conceives the ancients as keenly attuned to what Nietzsche terms the ‘art of living’ (AC sec.57, p.177/KSA 6, p.242).36 He argues that the Greeks (ie. the ‘free’ male population) conceived life itself as a constantly evolving work of art. He finds within the Greeks a “principle of stylisation of conduct for those who wished to give their existence the most graceful and accomplished form possible” (HS II, pp. 250-251).37
 Foucault contrasts two aspects of the history of the problematization of bodily pleasures. On the one hand, the construction of universal laws and principles concerned with the codification of conduct in terms of prohibitions and interdictions and, on the other hand, the practice of self-regulation or ascesis. In Foucault’s view the latter, ‘ethics-oriented’ practices, were more important in the Greco-Roman world than the former, ‘code-oriented’ moralities. As he states, 
         I am referring to what might be called the “arts of existence”... those intentional and
         voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also 
         seek to transform themselves...to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic 
         values and meets certain stylistic criteria...an aesthetics of existence...a way of life whose moral
         value did not depend either on one’s being in conformity with a code or behaviour, or on an 
         effort of purification, but on certain formal principles in the use of pleasures...its regard for an 
         ontological structure and its visibly beautiful shape...moral reflection was less concerned with 
         specifying the codes to be respected and the list of acts that were permitted and prohibited than
         it was concerned with characterizing the type of attitude, of relationship with oneself that was
         required (HS II, pp.10-11, 89, 209). 38

 Foucault describes the “techniques of the self” (HS II, p.11) through which the Greeks endeavoured “to shape themselves as ethical subjects” (HS II p.13). This ‘etho-poetic’ (ibid) activity was pursued with particular rigour in those areas of life in which no major prohibitions existed. Hence the Greeks developed an “intense problematization of sexual practice” (HS II, p.24). Foucault demonstrates how the Greeks’ self-regulation of sexual pleasure was not an asceticism in the Christian sense. The Greeks thus developed a non-ascetic form of ascesis founded on an affirmative evaluation of the sexual pleasures. Foucault argues that the Greeks’ self-restraint was not based on an a priori hostility to the ‘body’ but was pursued as a demonstration of their ‘active’ and ‘virile’ character which enhanced their credibility as citizens and rulers.
 Foucault particularly emphasises two central aspects of Greek ascesis, namely, ‘self-mastery’ (enkrateia) and ‘moderation’ (sophrosyne). Through these themes the Greeks sustained an agonistic relation to the two principal threats posed by the aphrodesia, namely, “excess and passivity” (HS II, p.47). Regarding sexual activity as an intrinsically excessive force of nature the Greeks sought to perfect techniques of ‘self-mastery’ in order to acquire ‘moderation’. The aim was the equilibrium in which the ‘appetites’ were controlled but not denied. To attain this ‘virtue’ was to avoid enslavement to the pleasures and the passivity this entailed. Through ‘moderation’ the Greeks cultivated a sense of freedom based on, in Nietzschean terms, the ‘extra-moral’ containment (rather than transcendence) of the sexual pleasures. This exhibition of a ‘self-mastery’ enhanced the claim to rule others.39 In the following passage Foucault insists on the non-ascetic nature of the Greek form of ‘self-mastery’ and ‘moderation’, 
              ...it was defined by the setting up of a solid and stable state of rule of the self
                over the self; the intensity of the desires and pleasures did not disappear, but 
                the moderate subject controlled it well enough so as never to give way to 
                violence...enkrateia...presupposes the presence of desires and it is all the more
                valuable as it manages to control those that are violent. Sophrosyne...did not 
                imply the suppression of desires but rather their control... in the ethical practice 
                of the pleasures (HS II, pp.69-70).

 Foucault’s reconstruction of the subtleties of Greco-Roman ascesis enables him to thematise the specific type of ‘anxiety’ the ancients felt in relation to sexual pleasure given its associations with “violence, expenditure and death” (HS II, p.138). The Greeks were concerned with the “control and mastery one ought to exercise over oneself” (HS II, p.125) in order to counter such destabilizing forces. 
 The relevance of Foucault’s excavation of the Greeks’ ‘extra-moral’ ethics lies in its demonstration of an affirmative problematization of sexual pleasure, a possibility that cannot be accommodated within the terms of the ‘Platonic-Christian’ tradition in which morality and ‘desire’ are opposed.40 Foucault shows how the Greek individual developed a non-ascetic form of self-control in order to demonstrate an “ability to subdue the tumultuous forces that were loosed within him” (HS II, p.139). The Greeks employed non-repressive techniques to control the involuntary forces associated with sexual pleasure. The consequences for the interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought of Foucault’s retrieval of ‘extra-moral’ forms of the ‘ascetic ideal’ must now be considered.    
                                                          V
 I have argued that Foucault’s account of what, in ‘Nietzschean’ terms, can be called ‘noble’ ascesis makes a fundamental, though largely implicit, contribution to the interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought. Such an affirmative problematisation of bodily pleasures is a ‘nature-culture’ hybrid which cannot be thematised in terms of the oppositions of Platonic-Christian metaphysics. The oppositional schemas of this tradition only refer to the ‘meaning of the ascetic ideal’ (whether adopted or rejected) based on the depleted physiology of the ‘slave’. Hence, Nietzsche’s critique of Platonic-Christian values and his development of alternative notions of ‘health’ and ‘nobility’ cannot be adequately discussed in terms of the ‘nature/culture’ opposition. Whatever ‘discontents’ Nietzsche might, in anticipation of Freud, have attributed to the processes of ‘civilization’, his most radical thought (ie. the ‘affirmation of the Dionysian’) does not propose either an unbridled liberation of the ‘animal’ in man, or (as in Freud) the resigned conformism and complicity with humanism’s construction of the ‘normalized’ bourgeois individual.41 Instead, Nietzsche offers the transvaluative vista of new forms of affirmative ascesis. 
 But there are some significant ‘tensions’ between Foucault’s account of Greco-Roman ascesis and Nietzsche’s thought. Foucault’s presentation of the fourth century Greeks’ (particular the ‘Socratic-Platonic’ tradition’s) cultivation of an, in effect, ‘extra-moral’ type of ascesis, an ethics of self-restraint not based on an a priori hostility to bodily pleasures, is clearly at odds with Nietzsche’s most consistent evaluation of Greek cultural history. Foucault’s account of the Greeks cuts across Nietzsche’s general opposition, in BT, of the Dionysian and the Socratic. Even acknowledging the complex evaluation of both Socrates and Plato throughout Nietzsche’s writings it is not easy to reconcile his valorisation of the fifth and sixth century Greeks with Foucault’s account of their fourth century descendents.42 In BT Nietzsche describes the ‘classical’ Greeks of the fourth century as a culture in terminal decline into ‘sickness’ from the ‘health’ witnessed in the ‘tragic’ age. In contrast, Foucault, employing a fundamentally ‘Nietzschean’ approach, describes the ‘classical’ Greeks in essentially affirmative terms. 
 The questions raised by the disparity between Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s evaluations of the fourth century Greeks are not of a merely ‘historical’ order. Indeed this discrepancy exposes the ‘conflicts’ in Nietzsche’s thought that lie at the basis of the two contrasting interpretative perspectives on his texts outlined above and which Foucault’s work implicitly both exposes and ‘resolves’. The underlying issue here is the seeming incompatibility between the Dionysian and ascesis. Even Foucault’s presentation in ‘extra-moral’ terms of the Greeks’ conception of ‘self-mastery’ (enkrateia) and ‘moderation’ (sophrosyne) does not, as I noted above, deny that their self-disciplining practices were concerned with gaining control over the ‘violent’ forces of sexuality that are indifferent to reason and which undermine the individuated self. Yet the feature of ‘tragic’ culture that Nietzsche most admires is the pre-Socratics’ non-pessimistic and affirmative evaluation of just these unconscious, instinctual forces that elude intelligibility, in short, their ‘affirmation of the Dionysian’.43 The question arises therefore as to whether the features and aims of Greek ascesis Foucault recovers are not precisely those derided by Nietzsche as mere “civic mediocrity” (BT sec.11, p.77/KSA 1, p.77).
 On the basis of BT it is difficult not to conceive of ascesis as anything other than a process of domestication founded on a hostility towards the Dionysian, the dimensions of existence that operate beyond the reach of conscious self-regulation. How can the tragic period’s affirmation of ‘self-oblivion’ be reconciled with the post-Socratic period’s valorisation of ‘self-mastery’? What compromise can there be between the Dionysian perspective encapsulated in the claim “excess revealed itself as truth” (BT sec. 4, p.46/KSA 1, p.40) and the Socratic valorisation of ‘nothing in excess’?44
 However, perhaps framing the issues in this way lapses back into a perspective fundamentally premised on the ‘negative’ model of power in general and the ‘repressive hypothesis’ in particular. Arguably, the interpretation of the Dionysian implicit in the dilemma outlined above presupposes exactly the traditional repression/transgression conception of power and resistance to it which Foucault decisively challenges. If so, Foucault’s work makes possible a rethinking of the Dionysian on the basis of the  notion of intensification rather than transgression. From this perspective the apparent irreconcilability between the Dionysian and ascesis disappears so far as it is possible to conceive ‘noble’ ascesis as a self-disciplining carried out in pursuit of the intensification of the pleasures of the whole economy of the ‘human’ rather than an attempt, through ‘denial’, to transcend them. Hence, Foucault’s ‘Nietzschean’ account of Greco-Roman ascesis implicitly underscores an interpretation of GM III as an eroticisation of the ‘ascetic ideal’ which, in its affirmative (ie. non-Christian) forms was increasingly abandoned. 
 This rethinking of the ‘meaning of the ascetic ideal’ in Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s texts insists on the ‘autonomy’ of pleasure so far as ascesis is a ‘use of pleasure’ for ‘internal’ aims, an auto-intensification that does not serve ‘external’ ends. This is an ‘extra-moral’ phenomenon, a self-intensificatory interplay of ‘reason’ and ‘desire’ no longer conceived oppositionally. The practice of ‘noble’ ascesis is the exploration of the auto-intensificatory processes that characterise a self-expending system in which the affirmation of pleasures disseminates the ‘ego’ in contrast to the ‘slave’s’ pursuit of morality in which it is underwritten and defended by the ‘denial’ of such forces. 
 Nietzsche provides an important avowal of such a conception of ascesis in the following passage which contains striking thematic affinities to HS II-III,
         The teaching meden agan [‘nothing in excess’] applies to men of overflowing strength -
            not to the mediocre. The enkrateia and askesis is only a stage toward the heights: 
            the “golden nature” is higher...The barbarian gods express nothing of the pleasure of 
            restraint (Lust am Mae)... (WP no. 940, p.495/KSA 11, p.105).45

 This remarkable passage clearly cannot be read in oppositional terms. Rather than opposing Dionysian ‘transgression’ to ascetic ‘repression’ Nietzsche evokes a contrast between ‘healthy’ (ie. “men of overflowing strength”) and ‘sick’ (ie. “the mediocre”) varieties of ascesis. If Foucault’s similar conception of these phenomena is recalled then both thinkers can be read in terms of the recovery of a non-utilitarian conception of the ‘ascetic ideal’ in which the regulation of the disseminative forces of bodily pleasure is not undertaken in order to construct and preserve a ‘pure’ realm of interiority or self-identity. Unlike ‘moral’ forms of ascesis (the merely self-preservative nature of which Nietzsche persistently unmasks) the passage cited above gestures towards ‘extra-moral’ practices of ‘self-denial’ that are deployed as non-defensive strategies of intensification and aesthetic self-stylisation (ie. “the pleasure of restraint”). 
 Such a ‘noble’ ascesis, unlike its ‘slave’ counterpart, directly affirms its libidinal nature. It is an inhabitation of the ‘ascetic ideal’ in which ‘self-denial’ and ‘self-expenditure’ are no longer negatively related. Both Nietzsche and Foucault implicitly claim that ‘affirmation’ (ie. the Dionysian) intrinsically contains a non-negative ‘no’ (ascesis), a non-dialectical ‘negation’ that contributes nothing to the production of a positivity. Similarly they gesture towards an asceticism that intrinsically contains an affirmative ‘yes’ (the Dionysian) that is not merely a utilitarian strategy of defence. ‘Noble’ ascesis is a non-accumulative process of affirmative ‘denial’ pursued as an aesthetico-libidinal strategy of intensification, a form of auto-eroticism.46            
 Yet if, on the basis of Foucault’s thought, it becomes possible to discern a positive evaluation of ascesis in Nietzsche’s texts the question arises as to how this is related to his persistent critique of the alleged primacy of consciousness and notions such as ‘self-determination’, ‘intentional agency’ (ie. the ‘will as cause’) etc. Can ascesis be compared to a ‘flash of lightning’, the image Nietzsche employs when criticising the metaphysical distinction between ‘doer’ and ‘deed’? Doesn’t ascesis inherently presuppose a ‘self’ and does it not thereby ‘separate a force from what it can do’?47
 In response it is important to re-emphasise that Nietzsche’s renaturalization of man does not contest the existence of ascesis but instead rejects idealist interpretations of it. Hence ascesis does not intrinsically presuppose, or ‘analytically’ contain, the notion of ‘free will’ and does not, as Foucault’s analyses of Greco-Roman forms of it demonstrate, necessarily seek to uncover a ‘truth’ about a pre-given ‘self’ in the sense of a ‘hermeneutics of desire’. Nietzsche offers an auto-affective account of the origins of ‘self-consciousness’, conceiving it as a derivative by-product (of negligible causal efficacy) that occurs in the interstices of the play of impersonal forces which constitute the ‘human’. That humans are self-conscious animals does not necessarily signal a non-material essence but that they, in comparison to other animals, are the product of highly conflicting historico-material processes. As Nietzsche states,
         In contrast to the animals, man has cultivated an abundance of contrary drives and
            impulses within himself...Moralities are the expression of locally limited orders of 
            rank in his multifarious world of drives...The highest man would have the greatest
            multiplicity of drives, in the relatively greatest strength that can be endured. Indeed
            where the plant “man” shows himself strongest one finds instincts that conflict
            powerfully...but are controlled (WP no. 966, pp. 506-507/KSA 11, p.289).48
 This passage gives both a thoroughly libidinal, yet non-reductive, description of ascesis (“the expression of locally limited order of rank in his multifarious world of drives”) and importantly it asserts, in ‘physiological’ terms, the possibility of a ‘noble’ variety of it (“where...“man” shows himself strongest...”).49 
 Hence Foucault’s recovery of affirmative instances of the ‘ascetic ideal’ makes manifest a strand of Nietzsche’s thought which requires a reconfiguration of the ‘standard’ interpretation of his thought. Nietzsche and Foucault are thus seen to  implictly challenge the Platonic-Christian tradition’s seeming monopoly over the ‘ascetic ideal’. Rather than simply rejecting it and thereby succumbing to a merely oppostional mode of critique, they gesture towards an appropriation of asceticism not based on theologico-humanist values.
 In summary, I have argued that Foucault’s account of Greco-Roman ascesis, precisely because of its ‘Nietzschean’ orientation, implicitly offers important resources for both exposing ‘tensions’ within Nietzsche’s texts and for demonstrating which strands of his thought are the most rigorous and radical. I have suggested that two, fundamentally contrasting, interpretations (the ‘oppositional’ and the ‘economic’) have been given of Nietzsche’s conception of the relation between morality and the ‘body’ and that Foucault’s late work on ascesis tacitly underscores the ‘economic’ reading. Foucault’s reconstruction of Greco-Roman ascesis uncovers what can be viewed as, in the Nietzschean sense, ‘noble’ inhabitations of the ‘ascetic ideal’. This enables interpreters of Nietzsche to appreciate a significant and continuing realignment of some of the key themes and terms of his discourse, a process that culminates in a non-reductive synthesis of the themes of the Dionysian and ascesis. 
 Clearly the claims made in this paper have been largely ‘formal’ in nature. I have sought to establish how Foucault’s, fundamentally ‘Nietzschean’, thought entails the rejection of the imposition onto Nietzsche’s thought of oppositional schemas and simplistic models of power even though such interpretations are licensed by many aspects of Nietzsche’s texts. This clarification of the relative radicality of different ‘voices’ within Nietzsche’s text makes possible a more nuanced conception of his notions of ‘health’ and ‘sickness’ which overcomes the apparent ‘opposition’ in his texts between the ‘affirmation of life’ and the ‘ascetic ideal’.50
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30. On the nature and mutations of ‘pastoral power’ in the modern period see M.Foucault: “The Subject and Power” in H.Dreyfus and P.Rabinow: Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: Chicago Uni. Press, 1983, pp.213-215); HS I, pp.18-26, 58-61. On the ‘hermeneutics of desire’ see HS I, pp.66-67; HS II, pp.3-7, 89, 92. These two notions are central to Foucault’s account of the evolution of the relation between power and bodily pleasure from the Greco-Roman to the Christian worlds as well as to his (often implicit) critique of psychoanalysis. For general overviews of this trajectory see FR p.366; HS I, pp.57-65, 67-73; HS II, pp.70, 249-254; HS III, pp.62, 67-68, 185, 235-240.
31. See M.Foucault: “The Subject and Power” (ibid, p.208)
32. Ibid.   
33. For Foucault’s conception of the notion of ascesis as retrieved from the ancients see HS II, pp.30, 72-77. In a sense the whole burden of HS II-III is the attempt to recover this notion of the ‘cultivation of the self’ as a challenge to the traditional focus on ‘codes’ and ‘laws’, a key symptom of the predominance given to the ‘negative’ model of the nature of power and failure to appreciate its ‘positive’ function. 
34. I am tacitly suggesting here that the perspective on ascesis that Foucault, drawing upon ‘Nietzschean’ resources, develops enables him, when ‘applied’ to Christianity, to surpass Nietzsche’s thought in radicality or, in other words, to radicalise Nietzsche’s thought in order to let it overcome itself. Clearly, in the few analyses of Christian texts Foucault produced the possibility emerges, largely absent from Nietzsche’s thought, of interpreting it as a practice of ascesis (ie. ‘positive’ power) rather than in solely ‘moral’ terms (ie. ‘negative’ power). For Foucault a truly ‘Nietzschean’ critique of Christianity would be fundamentally ‘aesthetic’ in nature - an approach Nietzsche, perhaps because of a personal animus toward Christianity, struggled to attain. From such a perspective the primary shortcoming of Christianity would not be its derivative, merely ‘moral’ dimensions (ie. the supposed ‘repression’ of sexual pleasure and ‘this world’ in general) but its ‘aesthetic’ failings as a form of ascesis. Christian ascesis is rejected because of the ugliness of its stylisation of life. The Christian life (rather than Christian art) is, as essentially a work of anti-art, aesthetically displeasing. Crucially this sustains the possibility of ‘aesthetically’ pleasing forms of non-Christian ascesis, the aesthetic success of which is quite unrelated to the severity of its strictures. Indeed, a totally unrestrained life (ie. the complete rejection of the ‘ascetic ideal’ based on the misinterpretation of the Dionysian in terms of ‘transgression’) is no more likely, due to its absence of ‘form’, to satisfy the ‘aesthetic’ criteria of ‘noble’ taste implicit in the Nietzsche-Foucault rethinking of the grounds of critique. In short, the aim of the Nietzsche-Foucault conception of praxis is the cultivation of ‘aesthetically’ satisfying forms of ascesis. It must be emphasised that the ontological nature of this ‘aesthetic’ process means that any description of it in terms of ‘aestheticism’ is mistaken.       
35. For an example of this contrast see ASC sec.5, pp.22-23/KSA 1, pp.17-19. I focus on Foucault’s discussion of the fourth century Greeks in HS II (rather than his analysis of the Hellenic and Roman periods in HS III) because of the importance of Greek culture to Nietzsche. For an interesting critique of Foucault’s appropriation of Greco-Roman thought (from an authority he acknowledges) see P.Hadot: “Reflections of the Idea of the “Cultivation of the Self”” in Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault (London: Routledge, 1995, trans. M.Chase, pp. 206-13). 
36. Nietzsche’s contrast between ‘noble’ and ressentiment moralities (see AC sec.24, p.135/KSA 6, pp.192-193) is also relevant here.
37. The obvious affinity here is to Nietzsche’s statements that, “the existence of the world is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon” (ASC sec.5, p.22/KSA 1, p.17);  “art represents the highest task and truly metaphysical activity of this life” (BT pp.31-32/KSA 1, pp.23-24) and, “the world as a work of art that gives birth to itself” (WP no.796, p.419/KSA 12, p.119). Again, Nietzsche’s conception of the ‘metaphysical’ primordiality of art cannot be accurately described as ‘aestheticism’. Foucault acknowledged and condemned the ‘anti-democratic’ nature of ancient society (see HS II, pp.22, 82, 126). However, that he did not let this fact obscure the importance of ancient forms of ascesis is clear from his treatment of this issue in “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress” in FR pp.340-372 (see especially pp.344-351), a text which offers an excellent summary of the main themes of HS II-III.
38. For this contrast between ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ which, to some extent, reflects the distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ power, see HS II, pp.30-32, 62; HS III, pp.16, 35, 41-41, 67-68, 124, 184-185, 235-240.
39. See HS II, pp.77-86.
40. See HS II, pp.125-139.
41. Again I make a passing reference here to the significant contribution Foucault’s thought tacitly makes to distinguishing Nietzsche from Freud. He demonstrates how Christianity and pyschoanalysis share many assumptions about the nature of power (the ‘transgression/repression’ model) and, through the techniques of ‘pastoral power’, how they both sustain a ‘hermeneutics of desire’ in which ‘truth’ and the ‘subject’ are constituted and entwined.
42. Nietzsche’s most characteristic stance is encapsulated in such comments as, “...Socrates and Plato as symptoms of decay” (TI p.29/KSA 6, p.68). However, his texts contain numerous alternative evaluations of post-tragic Greek culture. Even in texts contemporaneous with BT (leaving aside the ambiguous figure of the ‘music-practicising Socrates’!) more positive assessments of Socrates and Plato occur, see PTAG  sects.1, 2, pp.31, 34/KSA 1, pp.807, 809-810. Clearly, Nietzsche sometimes wished to dissociate both the ‘Socratic-Platonic’ and ‘Platonic-Christian’ complexes. 
43. I present this issue here in a deliberately pointed way in order to illuminate the essential themes. But it is important to recall the crucial role Nietzsche accords to the positive conception of the ‘Apollonian’ he finds in pre-Socratic culture. In general terms it is the pre-oppositional (ie. ‘economic’) relation between the ‘Apollonian’ and the ‘Dionysian’ that is central to the ‘tragic’ in Nietzsche’s view. It is the reductive appropriation of the ‘Apollonian’ in the Socratic period, not the ‘Apollonian’ per se that Nietzsche criticises as one of the key elements in the ‘death of tragedy’. It is the opposition between the ‘Apollonian’ and the ‘Dionysian’ which characterises, in different ways, both the pre- and post- tragic (ie. the ‘pessimistic’ and ‘optimistic’) periods, that Nietzsche criticises in Greek culture. In contrast, Nietzsche argues that the ‘tragic’ period develops what I term an ‘economic’ conception of their relation that makes possible a transvaluation of the optimism/pessimism opposition. I discuss some of the key issues in this area in, “A ‘Pessimism of Strength’: Nietzsche and the Tragic Sublime” in J.Lippitt (ed.).: Nietzsche’s Futures (London: Macmillan, in press). 
44. What I do not consider here, principally for ‘hermeneutic’ reasons, is that the contrast between the ‘affirmation of the Dionysian’ and ascesis can be accounted for in terms of a ‘periodization’ of Nietzsche’s thought. 
45. In another intriguing passage (WP no.916, pp.483-484/KSA 12, pp.552-553) Nietzsche reconfirms the point that it is not the ‘ascetic ideal’ per se that he objects to but merely ‘moral’ appropriations of it. He asks “what has been ruined by the Church’s misuse of it?” Six items are listed in reply, including ‘asceticism’ and ‘monastery’. This suggests that both could be reclaimed from their ecclesiastical definition and redeployed within a ‘noble’ ascesis.   
46. Nietzsche’s thematisation of the relation between the ‘Apollonian’ and ‘Dionysian’ is relevant here. Obviously ascesis is pre-eminently an ‘Apollonian’ theme. The reference to the ‘medan agan’ in the passage cited above implicitly refers to the ‘Apollonian’. In BT (sec. 4, p.46/KSA 1, p.40) Nietzsche identifies the ethical meaning of the ‘measure’ fundamental to the ‘Apollonian’ in terms of this principle (as well as with the edict ‘Know thyself’). The passage cited above surpasses the pre-tragic relation between the ‘Apollonian’ and the ‘Dionysian’ as described in BT (ibid) and is more akin, in the ultimate ‘fusion’ it evokes between the two deities and the themes associated with them, of the ‘economic’ relation that characterises the ‘tragic’ period. Perhaps it is possible to speak of Foucault’s and Nietzsche’s conception of an eroticised, affirmative ascesis in terms of a ‘tragic’ ethics correlative to the tragedies in which the ‘tragic’ perspective manifests itself aesthetically.  
47. I evoke here in a general way Nietzsche’s ‘anti-humanist’ critique of the modern metaphysics of ‘substance’ and ‘subject’. Of the numerous texts that could be cited in this regard I have implicitly drawn upon, TI pp.37-38, 48-54/KSA 6, pp.77-78, 90-97; GM I sec.13, pp.28-29/KSA 5, pp.278-281; BGE secs.16-19, pp.27-31/KSA 5, pp.29-34; WP nos.370, 371, 480, 483, 484, 485, 487, 488, 490, 491, 492, 547, 548, 549, 550, 552, 556, pp.199-202, 266-272, 294-295, 297-300, 301-302/KSA 12, pp.398, 32;13, pp.301-302;11, pp.597-598;12, pp. 549, 465, 317-318, 391-392;11, p.650;12, p.112;11, pp.638-639;12, pp.143, 162;11, p.562;12, pp.101-102, 383-387, 140-141. I also implicitly refer here to Deleuze’s discussion of the ‘triumph of reactive forces’ in Nietzsche and Philosophy, (op. cit., pp.55-59, 112-114, 122-124). Some commentators find that, given his important contribution to the ‘death of man’, Foucault’s insistence on the significance of ascesis raises similar conflicts to those I am discussing in regard to Nietzsche. Yet perhaps Foucault’s work on ascesis contains resources for reconfiguring the ‘death of the subject’? Rather than the defence or elimination of the ‘subject’ the key issue becomes the evaluation, in terms of a typology of ‘will’, of different constructions of ‘subjectivity’. The genealogical critique of different self-stylisations is, from this perspective, more important and fruitful than the philosophical cul-de-sacs of many debates ‘for and against’ the ‘subject’. A crucial statement of Foucault’s creative ‘side-stepping’ of such impasses is “The Subject and Power” (op. cit) in which he writes of the contemporary requirement “to promote new forms of subjectivity” (p.215). Another, related, example of this approach is the ‘pragmatic’ assessment of ‘humanism’ in “What is Enlightenment?” (FR pp.32-50, see especially pp.42-45).    
48. See also BGE sec.19, pp.29-31/KSA 5, pp.31-34.
49. I have not, of course, been able to address fully the complex questions concerning ‘subjectivity’ raised by Foucault’s work on ascesis and how these impact on the interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought. The task concerns the relation between the notion of ‘noble’ ascesis and the theme of the ‘death of man’. The finest discussion of Foucault’s rethinking of the formation of ‘subjectivity’ in HS II-III as a process of ‘subjectivation’ in terms of the notions of ‘affectivity’ and the ‘doubling’ and ‘folding’ of forces, is found in G.Deleuze: Foucault (op. cit., pp.94-123). Deleuze also offers some illuminating comments on these issues in Negotiations (New York: Columbia Uni. Press, trans. M.Joughin, pp.91-93, 97-100, 105f, 113-118, 150f, 176). Foucault discusses these themes in “The Return to Morality” (op. cit., pp.252-254). He also responds to the charge that such an emphasis on ‘self-constitution’ is suspiciously ‘existentialist’ in “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress” (op. cit., pp.350-351). Again, the key here is to recognise that humanism’s exclusive claim to the notion of ‘self-formation’ can be contested, once its status as ‘merely’ an historical interpretation of it is recognised. Nietzsche and Foucault propose alternative, ‘aesthetic’ rather than ‘moral’, anti-humanist forms of ‘self-cultivation’ distinct both ontologically and evaluatively from theological and humanist appropriations of it.
50. To go further and sketch the ‘content’ of a practice of ‘noble’ ascesis and what it might involve in the contemporary world (for obviously Nietzsche’s emphasis on the historicality of human existence, as well as the overwhelming orientation of his thought towards the ‘future’, renders any notion of a ‘return’ to the Greeks meaningless) is beyond the scope of this paper. Such a task would require an ‘economic’ interpretation of such enigmatic texts as “What is Noble?” (BGE secs.257-296, pp.173-202/KSA 5, pp.205-240) and the notes collected as “Discipline and Breeding” (WP nos.854-1002, pp.457-519/KSA 11-13, passim). 
51. Another, highly contentious, aspect of Nietzsche’s thought subjected to a history of predominantly ‘oppositional’ interpretations which Foucault’s work on ascesis can help to reassess is the theme of the ‘overman’ (der bermensch). Perhaps, as a practitioner of  ‘noble’ ascesis, the ‘overman’ is a rather more self-disciplined, restrained figure than clichéd interpretations, premised on the ‘repression/transgression’ model of (‘negative’) power have assumed. This, essentially non-legislative ‘overman’, pursues a more radical path than transgression and is therefore able to disturb power relations in an immanent way. 
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